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Trends in International Business
Law: Towards a New
&Ethnocentricity?
Detlev F. Vagts*
Many legal practitioners and academicians who are sensitive to
changes within the area of international business law have sighted sig-
nals of a trend toward greater ethnocentricity in the United States.'
Whether such a trend exists is not an issue that can be disposed of
categorically, for the signals must be interpreted in light of the institu-
tion in question and the sector of economic activity involved. More-
over, an accurate resolution of the issue requires a comparison of the
current signals with those of previous periods. Indeed, the post-Smoot-
Hawley Tariff era of the late 1930's and the older mercantilist epoch
were periods during which signals indicated strong tendencies toward
beggar-my-neighbor policies.2 On the other hand, the post-World War
II era associated with Bretton Woods issued signals that represented a
swing toward the recognition of a need for internationally even-handed
policies. Since the late 1960's, however, there have been an increasing
number of signals which indicate that the United States may be about
to return to a policy of economic self-sufficiency and independence.
Several factors would provide explanations for such a trend. The
most obvious is the U.S. experience in Vietnam. Prior to the involve-
ment of the United States in Southeast Asia, the American public be-
lieved it had a unique duty to protect the world from malignant and
expansive dictatorships. While Americans have retained a distaste for
what they believe are human rights violations, they no longer have the
desire to take dangerous or expensive risks.
Secondly, a complex but definite relationship exists between a mil-
itary or political sense of adventure on one side and an activist eco-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University; A.B., LL.B., Harvard University.
1 Ethnocentricity is defined in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY as the
act of centering upon race as a chief interest or end. For the purposes of this piece, the author
limits the use of the term to describe the narrow pursuit of national economic gain.
2 For a recent official expression of such concern, see address by John Shenefield, Chief of the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, before ALI-ABA course of study on International
Antitrust (May 26, 1978), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,371.
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nomic aid posture on the other side. The Marshall Plan was only the
most conspicuous part of that complex. United States policies regard-
ing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund were both guided by an instinct that the
United States should not enforce a narrow, wooden rule of reciprocity
against countries struggling with conditions that the United States did
not have to confront. Foreign nations were allowed to maintain ex-
change controls, limit trade concessions, and borrow at non-business
rates. With surprising speed Europe and Japan recovered their old
prosperity and became dangerously prosperous rivals. United States
efforts to replicate the success of aid and cooperation programs in the
lesser developed countries were much less successful. No solution
could be found to the problem of creating an actively developing indus-
trial system where none had existed before. As it was faced with the
necessity for maintaining lengthy and expensive supporting operations,
Congress lost its former enthusiasm and shrank appropriations to a
rather modest portion of the GNP.
Thirdly, Americans are concerned with a perceived economic
threat from the revived northern industrial countries and the more
competitive and aggressive of the lesser developed nations. This con-
cern is enhanced by a certain apprehension that the United States has
reached an "industrial climacteric" similar to that which had caused
Great Britain to fall behind its German and American rivals in the
early part of the twentieth century.3 Pessimistic views have been ex-
pressed about the discipline of our labor force, the effectiveness of our
research and development efforts, and the capacity of our management.
Into this state of mild unease came the crashing impact of the October
War and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC)
price hike.4 The quantum leap in energy costs rapidly infiltrated the
whole economy and accelerated inflationary pressures. Though the
United States did not suffer as acutely as its friends and rivals, this
consolation provided scant comfort. Americans worried about the ca-
pacity of other raw material exporting nations to repeat the OPEC suc-
cess and responded nervously to these nations' vehement demands for
a more equal allocation of the benefits within the world economic or-
der.
Like the United States, other advanced industrial nations suffered
from these developments. Each had a motivation to turn inwards in
3 See D. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS 326-58 (1969), for an exploration of the
causes of Britain's relative decline before 1914.
4 See generally Jackson, The New Economic Policy and United States International
Obligations, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 110 (1972).
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self-defense. While the European Common Market expanded its mem-
bership to include nine states, it became more apprehensive of what
lurked outside its boundaries. Often the threat involved American
farmers or Japanese factory workers. In addition, the energy crisis and
the increase in the cost of raw materials had a heavy impact upon Eu-
rope and Japan. While neither was involved in the Vietnam War, each
determined that it no longer possessed a special mission to improve the
conditions of the lesser developed world.
Several domestic political developments within the United States
have also contributed to an inward emphasis. There has been a shift
from an "imperial" presidency, as embodied in the Nixon era, to one
tightly watched and controlled by a suspicious Congress. Unlike the
President who must maintain a posture of world leadership by balanc-
ing the interests of the United States with those of other nations, U.S.
congressmen are responsible almost exclusively to their constituencies.
The effect of this shift was compounded by the devolution of power
within the Congress from an authoritative leadership group to broader
segments within that body. The new style of congressional manage-
ment has tended to distribute more veto powers. The consequences
have been ambiguous. At times, attempts to impose burdens on foreign
trade or investment have floundered because of the difficulty of ob-
taining a consensus. On the other hand, inertia has weighed against a
change in the direction of liberality towards foreign interests.
Within the executive branch, there has appeared a gradual devolu-
tion of power away from the Department of State. Greater operational
authority is in the hands of the Departments of Treasury, Commerce,
and Agriculture. These agencies tend to see economic matters more
starkly since they are unaware of the web of political interactions which
would be apparent to a professional diplomat. The domestic depart-
ments have vocal and effective constituencies to remind them of the
need to protect the American economy. On the other hand, their con-
stituencies are at times broad enough to make clear to them that inter-
national economic relations are both complex and reciprocal.
Finally, Americans appear to have developed a greater psycholog-
ical aversion to thinking in large scale terms. There is a sense that a
city, or at most a state, is the appropriate unit for coping with problems.
In fact, there is a pervasive sense that no government is as helpful as is
private enterprise. There is a renewed interest in how much the "sun-
belt" or the Northeast has received in federal monies in comparison
with other parts of the country. Amid such localism, there is little room
for consideration of the international aspects of a situation.
Despite the signals of a trend toward ethnocentricity, other factual
13
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aspects of our situation indicate otherwise. More Americans than ever
before have traveled abroad. They can make overseas telephone calls
at lower rates. Exports and imports comprise an increasingly larger
share of our GNP. Americans are aware of their reliance on imports
for their growing energy and raw material needs. Thus our inward-
looking tendencies produce tensions against the dynamics of the real
economic world. 5 It is probable that nowhere are those tensions as
keenly felt as in the offices of the multinational enterprises. Within
those offices, decisions must be made to further global strategies against
the background of a world where national boundaries threaten to be-
come more, rather than less, significant.6 The effects of the strain are
felt indirectly by all of us.
TRADITIONAL CONFLICTS OF LAW
We look first for the effects of the new ethnocentricity in the tradi-
tional conflicts of law field. There the principal institution involved is
the judiciary, and the raw impact of interest politics is more muted than
in the corridors of the Congress or the bureaucracy. The search for
traces of ethnocentricity is complicated by the diffuseness of the issues,
the decentralized nature of the judiciary, and by the intermixture of
international and interstate issues. In a theoretical sense the choice of
law field is now more vulnerable to parochial pressures. Traditional
rules in the sense of the first Restatement moved to choose the appro-
priate law by virtue of an abstract connecting rule. For example, the
law applicable to a tort could be determined by the place where the
injury occurred. In spite of this rule, a forum could avoid the applica-
tion of that law, but only by declaring the result to be contrary to public
policy. This rule served to highlight any existing clash between the two
states. Modern views on conflicts of law rules have blurred this proc-
ess.7 One rule simply prescribes the application of the "better law."
This approach gives free rein to a court's preference for applying the
more familiar rules of its own jurisdiction. Still, the relatively small
number of international cases would render it premature to draw any
conclusions regarding a trend.8
5 See Rosencrance, Alexandroff, Koehler, Kroll, Laqueur & Stocker, ither Interdepen-
dence? 31 INT'L ORG. (1977); Waltz, The Myth ofNational Interdependence, in INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION 205 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
6 See Vagts, The MultinationalEnterprise: .4 New Challengefor Transnational Law, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 739 (1970).
7 For recent reviews of conflicts developments, see Leflar, Choice of Law: .4 Well- Watered
Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 10 (1977); von Mehren, Choice ofLaw and the Problem of
Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27 (1977).
8 This is especially true if one discounts cases arising in Canada as not quite international in
character.
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In the jurisdiction-foreign judgments area the courts have clearly
moved towards a position more sensitive to and respectful of foreign
institutions. In particular, the Supreme Court's decisions in cases in-
volving choice of forum and arbitration clauses have explicitly ap-
proved the diversion of cases from our national judiciary system.9 The
Court expressly mentioned the need to take a less parochial attitude
toward foreign tribunals. In the lower courts, the authority of nine-
teenth century rulings hostile to foreign judgments ha been under-
mined. Judgments from abroad are now recognized in much more
sympathetic opinions, even though most of these cases involve the
rather familiar procedures of British and Canadian courts. 10
Confficts questions also arise on the diplomatic level. Efforts to
dispose of confficts questions either by allocating functions, or by mak-
ing uniform the substantive rules are constantly followed by U.S. rep-
resentatives." The United States participates in the Hague Confer-
ences, in the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), and in bilateral negotiations. Observers have seen a
threat to the universality of the process in the tendency of the European
Economic Community (EEC) countries to concentrate on working out
differences through Community channels rather than through more
global institutions.' 2 Moreover, the work of the truly global agencies is
troubled by the diversity of the nations involved and the inability of
many to field teams of experts in the relevant areas.
OUTWARD REACH
The endeavor of U.S. authorities to extend the reach of American
legal rules indicates a recognition by the United States of the impact of
overseas events. However, this ethnocentric effort threatens to override
or supplant foreign rules with more familiar American precepts. At
times, it has an acute tendency to place the United States on a collision
course with other nations jealous of their sovereign prerogatives or hos-
tile to American policy. Moreover, the pejorative connotations at-
9 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. I (1972).
10 See, e.g., British Midland Airways, Ltd. v. Int'l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1974);
Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
11 For a review of progress on these fronts, see Nadelman, Clouds Over International Efforts to
Unify Rules of Conflict of Laws, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 54 (1977).
12 There are, however, some by-products of community activity such as the United States-
United Kingdom negotiation of a draft treaty on enforcement of judgments. 16 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 71 (1977) (initialed Oct. 2, 1976, but not yet submitted for advice and consent).
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tached to the word "extraterritorial" are indicative of the ease with
which an international issue may be created.
During the years immediately following World War II, American
efforts to extend the application of U.S. laws were generally met with
widespread international consensus. Nevertheless, several attempts by
the United States managed to provoke foreign reaction. For example,
U.S. courts applied the Sherman Act in a series of spectacular antitrust
cases to transactions that largely took place abroad, but which had ap-
preciable repercussions within the United States.13 The cases involved
agreements among the major concerns of industrialized countries that
attempted to adjust to the pre-World War II depression. In the more
optimistic post-war period, the United States found these agreements
unappealing. In several cases, the participation of businesses closely
allied to the Nazi regime served to enhance the moral fervor of the
antitrust division. 4 The foreign governments involved responded
often with protests and, less frequently, court decrees or legislation cal-
culated to cancel out American action.' 5 As the courts disposed of the
pre-war cases, the number of international cases on the docket of the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice declined. The Division
became more cautious as a result of its experience and brought fewer
cases in which difficulties could be encountered. Meetings between Di-
vision representatives and foreign officials at the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Conferences.
Understandings were reached with Canada and Germany that consul-
tations would be made prior to initiation of litigation. 6 As the major
industrial countries became more aware of antitrust policies, the peculi-
arity of American attitudes became less striking and less controversial.
A somewhat different tackwas taken by the cold-war embargo pro-
13 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 195 1),final decree iss'd, 105 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
14 Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. General Elec. Co.,
80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
15 See generally materials collected in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 1020-47 (2d ed. 1976).
16 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291 (1976). See Campbell, The Canada-United States
Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure, 56 CAN. B. REV. 459 (1978). The work product
of the OECD is represented primarily by the periodic reports of the Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Trade Practices.
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visions of the Trading with the Enemy Act.17 Initially, a fairly general
agreement to embargo the Soviet bloc nations was orchestrated by the
United States with the aid of their NATO allies under the COCOM
umbrella.' As that concensus faded, France and Canada sought a rap-
prochement with China that outran U.S. progress in that direction.
With regard to Cuba, most countries never shared the hostile attitude
of the United States. The provisions of the Act were gradually under-
mined by the desire of American business to retain business relation-
ships, the public's eagerness for a restoration of diplomatic relations, an
administrative concern for the disapproval expressed by U.S. allies,
and a congressional urge to confine the executive's powers. The liberal
rules which are presently in effect reflect these pressures. 19
While these traditional areas of outreach show signs of modera-
tion, new forms of outreach have developed. The Arab boycott legisla-
tion is one such example.20 The statute that was enacted responds to
foreign governmental actions that are in themselves extraterritorial in
nature. The American statute has extraterritorial characteristics as
well, since it applies to the conduct of Americans abroad. Such con-
duct includes actions by subsidiaries of American-based multinational
enterprises. To date, the foreboding expressed by some business lead-
ers about the intergovernmental reactions of the Arab countries has not
been borne out, although compliance has cost U.S. firms some business.
Another new development in the application of U.S. law abroad
deals with the problem of bribery. Through the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977,21 the United States confronted a widespread practice
that no nation publicly favors. Diplomats recommended a multilateral
17 Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of
Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, §§ 1-19, 40 Stat. 411).
18 COCOM (Coordinating Committee) was formed by several nations including the U.S. to
perform the day-to-day tasks of coordinating trade controls applying to the European Soviet Bloc.
S. METzGER, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1065 (1966). For a thorough study of U.S. export
controls, see Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present and Future, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 791 (1967).
19 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. No: 95-223, 91 Stat.
1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06), limited the president's powers in comparison with
the TRADING WITH THE ENEMY AcT, H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. REP. No.
466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4540.
20 Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2402(5) (1976)). For an analysis of the boycott legislation including study of the extraterri-
torial reach both of the Arab boycott and of the U.S. response thereto, see Steiner, International
Boycotts and Domestic Order. 4merican Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 54 TEX. L. REv.
1355 (1976).
21 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(amended various sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b) and 78ff)
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(1)-(2)).
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approach which would work out cooperative arrangements to deal with
cases as they arose. 22 Congress, however, adopted a unilateral ap-
proach that made it illegal for an American-based firm to make an il-
licit payment to a foreign official. The Act also mandated the
maintenance of more accurate corporate records and the institution of
control procedures designed to uncover and prevent illegal payments.
If the Act is applied literally by the courts, trials may be held in the
United States where American defendants stand accused, but where the
other parties to the transactions are absent. There are additional diffi-
culties with respect to the production of witnesses and documents. Any
damage to U.S. international relations by the Act, however, would be
less than that already caused by the initial revelations of U.S. payments
to officials in Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan.
As American concern for the environment has not yet been shared
by foreign nations, further outreach problems have developed.2 3 Along
with recent developments in environmental areas, public and private
pressures upon American-based firms to make their employment prac-
tices abroad conform to United States rules against discrimination are
mounting. Moreover, shareholders' resolutions have produced curious
effects outside the United States. For example, demands that corporate
management refrain from boycotts, bribery, activity in South Africa, or
from selling artificial milk by inappropriate means, have altered the
way in which American-based multinationals behave abroad.
2 4
DOMESTIC PREFERENCES
Until 1960, the United States could claim its policy on investment
flows was essentially neutral. Admittedly, a few benefits were accorded
to investments in underdeveloped countries which we wished to aid.
For instance, the U.S. provided guarantees against expropriation and
inconvertibility, along with benefits under the Internal Revenue
Code.2 5 With the advent of the 1960's, the U.S. began to reexamine the
22 For efforts at an international agreement, see Remarks of Feldman, Sensitive Payments
Abroad: International and Domestic Aspects, 71st Ann. Proc. Am. Soc. of Int'l L. 1 (1977).
23 For material on environmental impact statements relating to imports abroad, see 1976 DI-
GEST OF U.S. PRAC. IN INT'L L. 586-90.
24 Note, Influencing Multinational Corporations.- The Infant Formula Marketing Controversy,
10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 125 (1977).
25 For a review of U.S. investment guarantee programs, see T. MERON, INVESTMENT INSUR-
ANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 49-119 (1976); for a review of our tax laws in relation to "Less
Developed Countries," see Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Coun-
tries." A Critical Appraisal, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1966), and, more recently, Liebman, A
Formula for Tax-Sparing Credits in U.S Tax Treaties with Developing Countries, 72 AM. J. INT'L
L. 296 (1978).
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international investment process, largely because of the deterioration of
the United States balance of payments and the weakening of the dollar.
The 1962 Revenue Act sought to encourage domestic investment by
eliminating incentives for investment abroad. President Kennedy addi-
tionally obtained from Congress the interest equalization tax designed
to discourage foreigners from resorting to the U.S. securities market.
In 1965, the Johnson Administration began to urge compliance with
voluntary guidelines which limited the outflow of investment abroad.
These guidelines became mandatory with the enactment of the Foreign
Direct Investment Regulations on January 1, 1968.26 Although mul-
tinationals were able to maintain much of their momentum by borrow-
ing abroad for their foreign needs, the rules imposed stress upon eco-
nomic relationships with other industrial states. This was particularly
true where it required dividend repatriation at times when the interests
of foreign subsidiaries would indicate otherwise.
A few years later, scholars began to express a broader concern
about investments abroad. Initially, the growing body of scholarly
literature about multinationals caused host countries to fear that they
could not regulate such powerful guests into conforming with national
policies.2 7 Anxiety developed in the United States as well. Multina-
tionals were charged with exporting jobs and technology, escaping
stricter American regulation, and avoiding U.S. taxation. With the
support of the labor unions, the Burke-Hartke Bill28 was introduced to
curb the export of technology by forfeiting U.S. patent protections, and
by tariff and tax measures. Although the Burke-Hartke Bill never suc-
ceeded in surmounting administration and business resistance, some
traces of it can be found in the limitations Congress imposed on guar-
antees by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).2 9
OPIC is restricted in the amount of benefits it may grant large multina-
tionals, and it is forbidden from supporting operations that will pro-
26 Symposium, Transatlantic Investment and the Balance of Payments, 34 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. (1969).
27 For an American work reflecting these attitudes, see R. BARNET & R. MOLLER, GLOBAL
REACH, THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974).
28 For a contemporaneous analysis of Burke-Hartke (Foreign Trade & Investment Act of
1973), S. 151 & H.R. 62, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), see Fisher, The Multinationals andthe Crisis in
United States Trade and Investment Policy, 53 B.U. L. REv. 308, 335-55 (1973).
29 The OPIC legislation is found at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200(a) (1976), and was most recently
amended by Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
268, 92 Stat. 213 (1978). See H.R. REP. No. 670, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1090; S. REP. No. 505, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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duce products to compete in American markets.3"
While efforts were made to curb the export of U.S. technology, the
devaluation of the dollar and the Arab wealth resulting from the
revolution in oil prices also focused attention on the flow of foreign
investment into this country. A concern arose about the passage of
control over American enterprise into the hands of European and Near
Eastern capitalists. Extensive surveys indicated that Europeans had too
many problems at home to invest on a wholesale basis in the U.S. and
that Arab money was not seeking control.31 In this milieu, the
Supreme Court has declared state laws making it more difficult for
aliens to work or invest in this country to be unconstitutional.32
Equally important in evaluating a trend toward ethnocentricity is
the United States policy toward trade. A policy of free trade recognizes
the claims of the law of comparative advantage and seeks to optimize
the welfare of the world population by freeing trade to seek its own
level. An ethnocentric approach seeks, by excluding imports, to protect
entrepreneurs, investors, and workers within the country. The impetus
to lower trade barriers appears to have slackened since the post-war
decade, while protectionist voices have grown louder. In 1971, the
Nixon Administration temporarily raised all tariffs by ten percent.3 3 A
more permanent reaction may be found in a series of U.S. actions
designed to protect American industries from increasing foreign com-
-petition. For example, government actions have included the negotia-
tion of special agreements with foreign governments and producers for
the limitation of imports of textiles and steel. In addition, there has
been a sharp increase in the number and importance of proceedings
under the antidumping legislation.34 As the amount of losses absorbed
by governmental owners of steel industries indicate that foreign pro-
ducers are practicing dumping, the American reaction seems to be a
fairly orthodox and legitimate one.
30 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 901, 91
Stat. 1071 (1977) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262g).
31 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The surveys were authorized by
the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 94-479 §§ 1-11, 88 Stat. 1450-54 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 78b (1976)). The results are reported in 1-9 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1976). For a discussion of direct foreign
investment by the Arab nations, see Note, U.S Regulation of Direct Foreign Investment: Current
Developments and the Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 622 (1975).
32 See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). But see Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
86 (1973).
33 United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
34 B. Fisher, Dumping: Confronting the Paradox of Internal Weakness and External Chal-
lenge (unpublished article, 1978).
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A reliable assessment of the American policy on trade cannot be
made until Congress has either ratified or vetoed the agreements nego-
tiated at the latest GATT round. Unlike prior rounds where the em-
phasis was on the reduction of tariff rates, this round dealt primarily
with rules designed to restrict nontariff trade barriers. If Congress sub-
stantially accepts this set of rules, a major step against ethnocentricity
will have been taken. The United States will have surrendered two
specially American defensive tactics: the American selling price system
of valuing imports35 and the domestic international sales corporation.
36
The first imposes a heavy tariff burden on products by valuing them at
the higher American price in place of the price at which they are sold
abroad. The second provides a rather intricate subsidy for exports by
allowing the income tax to be deferred on such revenue.
CONCLUSION
This tour d'horizon of American international business policy in
the late 1970's is more encouraging than one might have imagined. Al-
though protectionist, ethnocentric forces are certainly present, the gains
won by these forces have been neither permanent nor extensive. Suc-
cessive administrations have supported an open trade and investment
system with sufficient ardor to defeat drastic protectionist moves. Had
the ten percent increase in tariff become permanent, had the Burke-
Hartke Bill been enacted en bloc into law, and had the boycott legisla-
tion not been amended, the United States could justly be charged with
having led a flight from an open world economy to one of self-suffi-
ciency and independence. As these events did not occur, there is reason
to hope that an ethnocentric trend will not prevail.
35 See sections 402 and 402a of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1401a, 1402 (1976)).
36 For a challenge to this institution, see Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade:
The DISC Case in GW7T, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978).
